QUOTE(有钱贪酒吞 @ 2008年10月04日 Saturday, 10:59 AM)
越南南北统一以后，就开始排华、反华。因为历史原因，在越南有100多万华人和华裔，90%以上的居住在南越。华人身上保留着中华民族勤劳致富\勤俭持家而又吃苦耐劳的精神,所以大部分都有一些个积蓄.越南统一后,北方当局当了政,认为他们是南越的走狗,统一后就开始排斥他们，没收他们的财产、强制拆除他们的房屋，驱赶出境。还在中越边境向我方开枪、开炮、蚕食国土，打死打伤我边防军民多人，弄得边境地区安无宁日。我政府被迫还击。这是78年我国官方的报道。
另外，当时中国政府的思想比较左，又扶持了柬埔寨的波尔布特，此人更加左，左得出奇。要把柬埔寨变成一个高纯度的共产主义社会。柬埔寨境内有高棉族、苗族、泰族、越族、老挝族及华人华侨等民族，波尔布特大肆追杀和排斥非高棉族人，特别是2万多越裔被杀得差不多了,这样就引起了越南政府的抗议，抗议未果，为保护越南在柬埔寨的越南侨民就出兵打他。而他又不是越南的对手，因为越南打了一百多年的仗，基本上就没消停过，加之中国当时派出的军事代表团，教给他们许多中国战术，为他们免费办学讲各种战术。这样以来，柬埔寨政府一败涂地。当时中国的中国政府为了将越南在柬的精锐部队如第3师、第8师、第316师等部队从柬牵回来，就对越进行了战争。
当时我军分为东线集团、西线集团。东线集团由许大和尚许世友指挥，西线集团由参加过援越军事代表团的杨得志指挥。临战换将，本是兵家大忌，但老邓还是将昆明军区司令员王必成和武汉军区司令员杨得志对调。
79年2月17日开始进攻。我军非常不顺利，起因一是将近二十年没有打过仗，部队缺乏实际作战经验，过去都是预先准备好的演习，而真正一旦打起来，步兵和炮兵、装甲坦克兵与步兵的协调不一致的问题全都暴露出来了。二是集团领导指挥能力水平僵化保守，想当然。三是什么都照搬。如杨得志对越南情况熟悉，但对昆明军区的参战部队不熟悉，许大和尚当时所指挥的主要是过去四野部队，打法和过去的领导不一样。他过去一直是在平原地区作战，根本就没考虑到越南是个山地国家，山高密林,什么全都是按照地图标出计算出来，然后命令部队在规定的时间内进攻拿下某区域。没有考虑到进攻后会遇到的问题和可能出现的意外情况。比如说对方是否按插了地雷，有无散兵等情况。过去咱们的地雷战、地道战、麻雀战、伏击战\游击战等在他们的身上发挥得不比中国差，甚至还好。弄得当时将认为兵笨，兵认为将是瞎指挥。还有一点就是当时要军队执行三大纪律八项注意，不准杀害妇女、儿童和老年人、残疾人。但忘了一点，每个国家民族都有自尊的，你带着枪炮去了他的国家，他就认为你是侵略者，全民皆兵。中共军队见到妇女儿童老年人就过去，但当一过去，他们就从隐蔽处拿出枪来偷袭中共军队，弄得头两天就伤亡了几千人。有些士兵甚至连一枪也没有放过就被人家黑枪打死了。但我军还是发扬了勇猛顽强的战斗精神，在付出了惨烈的代价后，攻占了越南北部重镇凉山。当时攻击凉山时，许大和尚下令，一草一木、一间房屋也不准留，饱经血衣的东线集团早已打红了眼，命令被不折不扣地执行了。凉山一失守，意味着通向河内的大门被打开了，一片平原，非常适合机械化部队作战，但当我军正准备大干一场，乘胜追击的时候，3月5日小个子突然间宣布我军已达到目的，撤回我方一线。命令下达后，前线全军将士哗然，但命令还是得执行。前线各部队呈倒卷席，交替掩护撤退。特别是东线部队伤亡惨重，撤退时能拿走的东西拿走，不能拿走的全部炸毁，边撤边开枪开炮发泄怨气。
1979年3月16日，东西两线部队全部撤回我方境内，79惩越告一段落。
历时一个月的战斗当中，双方付出了极其惨重的代价：
越方：死亡39，000人（正规军），地方、民兵不详，估计超过70，000人，负伤32，000人，被俘1，600人，战车被毁185辆，其他车辆120辆，火炮200门，枪支4100支。
中方：37，000～39,000人（官方只承认约26,000人），负伤37，000人，被俘260人，战车被毁282辆，其他车辆490辆，火炮670门，枪支3100支。
关于撤退的原因,一是当时的后勤跟不上去.前面的部队打上去了,但后面的粮草\弹药跟不上.二是当时我国对苏联在黑龙江\内蒙\新疆在北方边境线上陈兵百万还是有顾虑的,深怕把越南打趴下了苏联会对我国宣战.三是当时世界的舆论对中国不利,因为除了柬埔寨外,其余的国家要么是谴责,要么是表示遗憾的,非常孤立,得不到世界大多数国家的支持.四是邓要发动一场有限的战争,目的是为了锻炼一下军队.所以打了几个星期就撤退了.
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这里是第三方的陈述，或许可提高供更多信息：
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_War
Sino-Vietnamese War
The SinoCVietnamese War, also known as the Third Indochina War, was a brief but bloody border war fought in 1979 between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The PRC launched the offensive in response to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia, which ended the reign of the PRC-backed Khmer Rouge. After a brief incursion into Northern Vietnam, PRC troops withdrew about a month later. Both sides claimed victory in the last of the Indochina Wars of the twentieth century.
....
PRC vs. Vietnam: Third Indochina War
Where the first war emerged from the complex situation following WWII and the second exploded from the unresolved aftermath of political relations with the first, the Third Indochina War again followed the unsolved problems of the earlier wars. The fact remains that: "Peace did not come to Indochina with either American 1973 withdrawal or Hanoi's 1975 victory" as disputes erupted over Cambodia and relations with China.
The PRC, now under Deng Xiaoping, was growing increasingly defiant. The USSR felt that there was simply no way that they could directly support Vietnam against the PRC; the distances were too great to be an effective ally, and any sort of reinforcements would have to cross territory controlled by the PRC or U.S. allies. The only realistic option would be to indirectly re-start the simmering border war with China in the north; Vietnam was important to Soviet policy but not enough for the Soviets to go to war over.
On February 15, 1979 the PRC publicly announced their intention to strike back the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Few observers realized the symbolic importance of this date. In an attempt to disrupt Vietnam, PRC snipers killed Vietnamese along the Chinese-Vietnam border. It marked the expiration of the 30 year-old 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, and thus the first time that the PRC could strike back a Soviet ally without breaking their own treaties. The reason cited for the counter strike was the supposed mistreatment of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese minority and the Vietnamese occupation of the Spratly Islands (claimed by the PRC).
Chinese Forces
Two days later, on February 17, a PRC force of about 200,000 supported by 200 tanks from the PRC People's Liberation Army entered northern Vietnam. The Chinese force consisted of units from the Kunming Military Region―later abolished，Chengdu Military Region， Wuhan Military Region―later abolished and Guangzhou Military Region, but commanded by the headquarters of Kunming Military Region in west front and Guangzhou Military Region in east front. Some troops engaged in this war, especially engineering units, railway corps, logistical units and antiaircraft units, had been assigned to assist Vietnam in its struggle against the United States just a few years earlier during the Vietnam War.
Contrary to the belief that over 600,000 Chinese troops entered Vietnam, the actual number was only 200,000. However, 600,000 Chinese troops were mobilized, of which 200,000 were deployed away from their original bases.[citation needed] Around 400 tanks (specifically T-54's) were also deployed.
The Chinese troop deployments were observed by US spy satellites, and the KH-9 Big Bird photographic reconnaissance satellite played an important role.[citation needed] In his state visit to the US in 1979, the Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was presented with this information and asked to confirm the numbers. He replied that the information was completely accurate. After this public confirmation in the U.S., the domestic Chinese media were finally allowed to report on these deployments.[citation needed]
Chinese Casualties
To this day, both sides of the conflict describe themselves as the victor. The number of casualties is disputed, with some Western sources claim PLA losses at more than 60,000 casualties, including about 26,000 killed
Chinese Debacle?
There were many reasons why it could be argued that the war was a disaster for the Chinese armed forces. First, the Chinese military was using equipment and tactics from the era of the Long March, World War II and the Korean war, which meant for example, that only Chinese officers carried assault rifles, while the Vietnamese had more modern Soviet (and U.S.)[citation needed] equipment, combined with assault rifles for every soldier.[17] Second, under Deng's order, China did not use their naval power and air force to suppress enemy fire, neutralize strong points, and support their ground forces[citation needed]. Therefore, the Chinese ground forces were forced into absorbing the full impact of the Vietnamese forces' firepower.[18] Third, the PLA lacked adequate communications, transport, and logistics. Further, they were burdened with an elaborate and archaic command structure which proved inefficient in the FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area).[17] Their maps were 75 years old. Runners were employed to relay orders because there were few radios―those that they did have were not secure. Fourth, China was one of the only two countries in the world at the time that lacked the military rank system (the other being Albania), and thus commands were not effective. Fifth, the Cultural Revolution had significantly weakened Chinese industry, and military hardware produced suffered from poor quality, and thus did not perform well. Finally, the Chinese struck back at an enemy that was highly experienced and confident from successive victories in wars with France, the U.S., and Cambodia. China's goal was to force the Vietnamese to pull out their 150,000 troops from Cambodia, where their Khmer Rouge allies were being extremely pressured upon. When the Chinese troops retreated, all 150,000 Vietnamese troops were still in Cambodia. To China, the Soviet-Vietnamese bond was disturbing, it seemed to the Chinese the Soviets were trying to "encircle" China. After the war, the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship remained strong.
以上内容源自wikipedia
仅供参考...
